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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years electronic discovery has been the media darling 
of legal writing, at least in the civil procedure arena.  The 2006 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were directed 
in large part to dealing with discovery of electronic information,1 
and they have generated enormous, and some would say undue,2 
attention to the broader subject of electronic evidence in law 
review articles,3
 
 1. See, e.g., Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 
26(b)(2)(B)—A Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery?, 13 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 12 (2007); Daniel Renwick Hodgman, A Port in the Storm?: The Problematic 
and Shallow Safe Harbor for Electronic Discovery, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 259 (2007); 
Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004); Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The 
December 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 171 (2006). 
 2. For a thoughtful article suggesting that the e-discovery crisis might be a 
little overblown, see Hon. James M. Rosenbaum, The Death of E-Discovery, 54 FED. 
LAW. 26 (July 2007). 
 as well as in numerous bar journals and other legal 
 3. See, e.g., Salvatore Joseph Bauccio, Comment, E-Discovery: Why and How E-
mail Is Changing the Way Trials Are Won and Lost, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 269 (2007); John 
L. Carroll, Developments in the Law of Electronic Discovery, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 357 
(2003); Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5 
SEDONA CONF. J. 125 (2004); James M. Evangelista, Polishing the “Gold Standard” on 
the E-Discovery Cost-Shifting Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 1 (2004); Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and 
Obtaining Metadata, 13 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2007); Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, 
Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of 
Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2000); Kindall C. 
James, Electronic Discovery: Substantially Increasing the Risk of Inadvertent Disclosure and 
the Costs of Privilege Review—Do the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Help?, 52 LOY. L. REV. 839 (2006); Lynn Jokela, Comment: Electronic 
Discovery Disputes: Will the Eighth Circuit Courts Move Beyond Ad-Hoc Decision Making?, 
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1031 (2004); Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic Discovery, NAT’L 
L.J., Nov. 24, 2003, at 30; Virginia Llewellyn, Electronic Discovery Best Practices, 10 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 51 (2004); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward 
Brave New World or 1984?, 236 F.R.D. 598 (2006); Richard H. Middleton, The 
“Complexities” of Electronic Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 105 (2004); Andrew Moerke 
Mason, Throwing Out the (Electronic) Trash: True Deletion Would Soothe E-Discovery 
Woes, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 777 (2006); Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. 
Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of Applying Traditional Doctrines of Spoliation 
to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14 (2006); Rebecca Rockwood, 
Comment, Shifting Burdens and Concealing Electronic Evidence: Discovery in the Digital 
Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16 (2006); Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic 
Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167 (2006); Hon. Shira 
A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 
2
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publications.4  Entire treatises have been written on the subject,5 
and a law school casebook focused on electronic discovery has even 
appeared.6  Prominent websites are devoted to “e-discovery,” as the 
subject has become known.7  Even before the 2006 amendments to 
the federal rules, the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for Complex 
Litigation recommended that any discovery plan address discovery 
of electronic information.8  The federal rules now expressly allow 
judges to require it.9
Comparatively little has been written on the myriad issues 
relating to how electronic evidence, once discovered, is treated 
when it is offered as proof.
 
10  Less still is written on how the issues 
are handled under Minnesota law.11
This article addresses the evidence issues presented by 
electronic evidence, and suggests how these issues should be 
addressed under Minnesota evidence law.  We specifically do not 
 
 
34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327 (2000); Bahar Shariati, Note, Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg: Evidence that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Provide the Means for 
Determining Cost Allocation in Electronic Discovery Disputes?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 393 
(2004); Withers, supra note 1.  Not all of the literature on electronic discovery was 
written in the twenty-first century.  Many of the issues have been recognized for 
decades.  See, e.g., Richard M. Long, Comment, The Discovery and Use of Computerized 
Information: An Examination of Current Approaches, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 405 (1986). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael C. McCarthy, Thinking Outside the Box: Recent Developments 
in Electronic Discovery, 61 BENCH & B. MINN., Dec. 2004, at 17; Kerry A. Brennan & 
Mia R. Martin, Threshold Decisions on Electronic Discovery, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov./Dec. 
2004, at 23; Stuart Miller & Stephanie Irby Randall, A Primer on Electronic Discovery 
for the General Practitioner, 39 ARK. LAW., Fall 2004, at 16.  
 5. See, e.g., RONALD J. HEDGES, DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED 
INFORMATION (2007); ADAM I. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: 
LAW AND PRACTICE (2003). 
 6. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (2008). 
 7. See, e.g., www.ediscoverylaw.com, a particularly helpful site maintained by 
the Seattle law firm K&L Gates, LLP. 
 8. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (J. Stanley Marcus et al. 
eds., 4th ed. 2004). 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
 10. “Early” articles addressing these issues include Andrew Jablon, Note, “God 
Mail”: Authentication and Admissibility of Electronic Mail in Federal Courts, 34 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1387 (1997); Anthony J. Dreyer, When the Postman Beeps Twice: The 
Admissibility of Electronic Mail Under the Business Records Exception of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1996); Christine A. Guilshan, Note, A Picture Is 
Worth a Thousand Lies: Electronic Imaging and the Future of the Admissibility of 
Photographs Into Evidence, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 365 (1992). 
 11. For one available source, see 11 PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA 
PRACTICE: EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2001) (addressing e-discovery in the context of 
individual rules of evidence and specific case decisions). 
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intend to contribute to the literature devoted to discovering 
electronic information.  We address the questions of how 
electronic evidence—whether a party’s own information, 
information obtained by investigation, or obtained from parties or 
non-parties in formal discovery—can be used in trial proceedings.12
II. THE UBIQUITY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 
  
We conclude that the Minnesota law of evidence is well equipped 
to deal with admissibility issues relating to electronic evidence.  
Indeed, it has been doing so successfully for decades. 
If there is one thing every commentator agrees on it is that 
most information, at least at some point in its life, is stored in 
electronic form.  Many documents or records exist only in 
electronic form.  Experts can only estimate just how large the 
margin of electronic form of documents is,13
The ubiquity of electronic evidence is not a “big case” issue, 
nor is it a “corporate” issue.  Discovery of electronic evidence can 
be encountered in virtually every type of case—personal injury, 
medical malpractice, marriage dissolution, trust litigation, and 
every other case type imaginable.  Phone records, cell phone 
 but there is no room 
to dispute that the majority of the evidence in many cases and 
virtually all of it in some cases, is created or used in electronic form. 
 
 12. “At trial” is really shorthand for any stage of the proceedings where 
admissibility will be assessed.  Evidence used in motion practice must be admissible 
as well.  See, e.g., In re Minn. Asbestos Litigation, 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996) 
(holding that exhibits were not authenticated where supported only by conclusory 
affidavits of counsel); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) 
(recognizing that for summary judgment, a court may only consider evidence that 
is admissible).  See generally 11A PETER N. THOMPSON & DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA 
PRACTICE: COURTROOM HANDBOOK OF MINNESOTA EVIDENCE 487 (West 2009), where 
the authors state: 
The most important rule to remember is that motions are decided on 
competent evidence.  As a general rule, if evidence would not be 
admissible at a trial, it should not be probative in a motion hearing.  As at 
trial, where evidence is expressly “offered” into evidence, evidence on a 
motion should be identified and made part of the record for the motion. 
See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON ESI EVIDENCE AND 
ADMISSIBILITY 2 (2008) (noting that summary judgment is the stage in the 
proceedings where e-evidentiary hurdles are most likely to be encountered).   
 13. At the Sedona Conference, it was estimated that in 2006, “we created, 
captured and replicated enough digital information to fill all of the books ever 
created in the world, 3 million times.”  Id. at 17.  By 2011, however, it is estimated 
that this “digital universe will be 10 times the size it was in 2006.”  IDC White 
Paper, The Diverse and Exploding Digital Universe: An Updated Forecast of Worldwide 
Information Growth Through 2011, at 2 (2008).  
4
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registers, personal computer information, photographs taken on 
digital cameras—all can be important evidence in these cases, and 
many of these “documents” are important in every type of litigated 
case.  E-mail is even more uniformly understood to be encountered 
and potentially important in every type of case. 
III. STANDARDS RELATING TO ADMISSIBILITY OF  
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 
A. Basic Evidentiary Status of Electronic Evidence 
There is no intrinsic barrier in the law of evidence to the 
admissibility of electronic evidence.  For example, e-mail may be 
admissible, but it also may be excluded from evidence even though 
relevant to the issues.14  In general, however, decisions excluding e-
mail from evidence do so for reasons other than the intrinsic 
nature of its electronic form—the evidence may not be relevant, or 
its receipt in evidence may have unfair prejudicial value that 
exceeds its probative value, or it may contain hearsay, etc.  As e-mail 
has become a pervasive part of decisions, exclusion of e-mails from 
evidence merely because they are e-mails is a feature of decisions 
from the last century.15
It is axiomatic that the discovery of information does not give 
rise to any presumption that it will be admissible at trial.  Indeed, 
just the opposite is so: clearly inadmissible information may well be 
discoverable.  To be discoverable under the rules of civil 
procedure, information need only be admissible or “reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
 
16
B. Issues Relating to Electronic Evidence 
 
The leading case dealing generally with the issues surrounding 
 
 14. Compare Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at 
*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (denying motion in limine to exclude e-mail), with 
Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that e-mail messages are not business records and thus inadmissible 
hearsay). 
 15. See, e.g., Monotype Corp. PLC, 43 F.3d at 449 (refusing to recognize e-mail 
messages as business records). 
 16. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(a); Ramsey County v. S. M. F., 298 N.W.2d 40 
(Minn. 1980).  The federal counterpart to this portion of Rule 26.02(a) is 
identical.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  Evidence may be discoverable even if only 
potentially useful for impeachment.  See, e.g., Boldt v. Sanders, 261 Minn. 160, 111 
N.W.2d 225 (1961). 
5
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admissibility of electronic evidence is Lorraine v. Markel American 
Insurance Company.17  It is a leading case not because it is the first—
electronic evidence has been considered in various forms for 
years—it is a leading case because it comprehensively and 
thoughtfully addresses many of the issues.  The court in Lorraine 
stated that five evidentiary questions relate to the admission of 
electronic evidence before it can be found to be admissible: 
whether the evidence is (1) relevant, (2) authentic, (3) not hearsay 
or admissible hearsay, (4) the “best evidence,” and (5) not unduly 
prejudicial.18  In addition to addressing these legal requirements, 
Lorraine is useful precedent because it deals separately with 
numerous categories of evidence that appear in electronic form.19  
Specifically, the court considered e-mail,20 Internet web postings,21 
text messages and chat room content,22 computer-stored records 
and data,23 computer animations and computer simulations,24 and 
digital photographs.25
1. Relevance 
  Each of the five evidentiary questions 
addressed in Lorraine has a well-recognized place in the existing law 
of evidence in Minnesota. 
All evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible.26  In 
that respect, there can be nothing unique to electronic evidence on 
this front.  Relevance is not a unique feature of the evidence itself, 
but rather, essentially a judgment about its connection to the issues 
in the case.  Evidence is relevant if it “logically tends to prove or 
disprove a material fact in issue.”27
2. Authenticity 
  It is hard to think of a piece of 
evidence that would be relevant in electronic form but not relevant 
in paper or some other format. 
Authenticity is a simple prerequisite to master.  This 
 
 17. 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007). 
 18. Id. at 538. 
 19. Id. at 554–62. 
 20. Id. at 554–55. 
 21. Id. at 555–56. 
 22. Id. at 556. 
 23. Id. at 556–59. 
 24. Id. at 559–61. 
 25. Id. at 561–62. 
 26. MINN. R. EVID. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”). 
 27. Boland v. Morrill, 270 Minn. 86, 99, 132 N.W.2d 711, 719 (1965). 
6
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requirement simply asks: “Is this evidence what it purports to be?”28  
Authenticity is often the central battleground for determining 
admissibility of electronic evidence, as electronic records may be 
readily altered and made to appear to be something they are not.  
It is not at all difficult to create a document that looks like an e-
mail sent by one of the parties to the case.29  As we all know from 
the spam in our inboxes, it is also possible to create an actual e-mail 
message sent from a purported author who has never seen, sent, or 
authorized it.30
This was also true in the era of typewriters and carbon paper,
 
31 
when parties would occasionally seek to create a document out of 
whole cloth or fabricate some detail, such as backdating it.32  Aside 
from potentially subjecting its creator to sanctions,33 the document 
would not be authentic and therefore not admissible (except 
possibly in a prosecution of the fabricator).  Medical records have 
long been targets of individuals or organizations seeking to rewrite 
or at least “polish up” history.34
 
 28. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(a); MINN. R. EVID. 901(a). 
  Medical records are increasingly 
found only in electronic form; most medical record systems have, 
or should have, specific mechanisms to permit the record 
custodian to verify when an entry was made, by whom, and that it 
hasn’t been altered. 
 29. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical Coll., 321 F.3d 652, 653–54 
(7th Cir. 2003) (involving falsified letters and e-mails in an employment 
discrimination suit). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Kilbride, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (D. Ariz. 
2007) (discussing the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act of 2003, aimed at preventing spam senders from deceiving 
intended recipients as to the source or subject matter of the e-mail messages); see 
also Joseph F. Cella III & John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and the Internet: Meeting 
the Challenge of the Next Millennium, 52 BUS. LAW. 815, 826 (1997) (detailing what is 
known as “spoofing,” which is the altering or falsifying of e-mails to impersonate a 
real person or user ID of a real person).  
 31. “Carbon paper n.  A lightweight paper coated on one side with a dark 
waxy pigment, placed between two sheets of blank paper so that the bottom sheet 
will receive a copy of what is typed or written on the top sheet.”  THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 280 (4th ed. 2000).  Carbon 
paper was widely used before photocopiers came into widespread use. 
 32. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, A Tale of Two Typewriters, 10 STAN. L. REV. 409, 
420–21 (1958) (analyzing a typewritten forgery). 
 33. See, e.g., Derzack v. County of Allegheny, 173 F.R.D. 400, 403 (W.D. Pa. 
1996) (imposing dismissal as sanction for fabricating evidence). 
 34. See, e.g., Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 430 A.2d 1, 15 (Conn. 1980) (examining 
the substitution of a falsified document in a patient chart after adverse incident).  
See generally Stanford M. Gage, Alteration, Falsification, and Fabrication on Records in 
Medical Malpractice Actions, 27 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 476 (1981). 
7
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3. Hearsay  
To some degree, most electronic evidence presents a hearsay 
question.  Hearsay is defined to be a statement, other than one 
made by the witness in court, offered to prove the truth of the 
matter.35  Hearsay is generally not admissible in evidence,36 though 
the exceptions to that rule are abundant.37
The rules include dozens of specific exceptions to the general 
rule that hearsay is inadmissible.
 
38  Rule 803 identifies twenty-three 
categories of hearsay that may still be admissible, without regard to 
whether the person who made the statement is available to testify.39  
Rule 804 identifies additional exceptions applicable only when the 
declarant is not available to testify.40
4. “Original Writing” 
 
The “original writing” rule is one of the more perplexing rules 
of evidence.  The rule is made more opaque by its misleading 
sobriquet, the “best evidence” rule.  Set forth in Minnesota Rules of 
Evidence 1002, the rule is simple in text: “To prove the content of a 
writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, 
or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these 
rules or by Legislative Act.”41  As is true for hearsay, the “except” 
clause is as important as the rule because duplicates are routinely 
admissible instead of the original.42
 
 35. See MINN. R. EVID. 801.  The statement can be an oral or written assertion, 
or it can be non-verbal conduct intended to be an assertion.  Id. at 801(a). 
 36. See MINN. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by 
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by the 
Legislature.”). 
 37. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(2)–(23) (listing the exceptions). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. MINN. R. EVID. 804(b). 
 41. MINN. R. EVID. 1002. 
 42. See MINN. R. EVID. 1003 (“A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as 
an original . . . .”). 
  Rule 1004 provides the means 
of admissibility when an original is not available, Rule 1005 
provides special rules for “public records,” and Rule 1006 allows for 
receipt of summaries in lieu of voluminous underlying evidence. 
The electronic environment does require analysis of how this 
requirement is met, and there is not always an obvious parallel to 
how it is met for paper records. 
8
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5. Absence of Undue Prejudice (Rule 403) 
Rule 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be 
excluded from admission.  Although the rule is a relevance rule, it 
operates to override the general rule that relevant evidence will be 
admissible.43  Rule 403 frequently presents challenges for electronic 
evidence, particularly for documents created by computers, such as 
animations and other illustrative exhibits.44
The five-factor test developed in Lorraine is similar in result 
and somewhat more readily applied than an eleven-factor test 
advocated in In re Vinhnee, an earlier bankruptcy appellate 
decision.
 
45
 
 43. Specifically, this important rule provides: “Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”  MINN. R. EVID. 403. 
 44. See generally Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559–560 (D. 
Md. 2007) (discussing the unique authentication issues with computer animation 
and simulation). 
 45. See In re Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).  The 
court’s eleven-factor test for whether adequate foundation for receipt of electronic 
evidence was adapted from EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 
4.03[2] (5th ed. 2002), and requires that the proponent of electronic evidence 
establish that: 
1. The business uses a computer. 
2. The computer is reliable. 
3. The business has developed a procedure for inserting data into the 
computer. 
4. The procedure has built-in safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify 
errors. 
5. The business keeps the computer in a good state of repair. 
6. The witness had the computer readout certain data. 
7. The witness used the proper procedures to obtain the readout. 
8. The computer was in working order at the time the witness obtained 
the readout. 
9. The witness recognizes the exhibit as the readout. 
10. The witness explains how he or she recognizes the readout. 
11. If the readout contains strange symbols or terms, the witness explains 
the meaning of the symbols or terms for the trier of fact. 
 (citation omitted). 
  Vinhnee’s more arduous eleven-factor test should be 
borne in mind, however, as it does overcome the potential 
shortcomings inherent in Lorraine’s more cursory analysis of 
potential admissibility issues.  Prudent counsel should be prepared 
to address any of the eleven Vinhnee factors. 
9
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IV. OVERVIEW OF MINNESOTA EVIDENCE LAW 
Minnesota’s evidence law reposes primarily in the Minnesota 
Rules of Evidence.  The rules were adopted in 197746 and were 
modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The major part of 
evidence law not appearing in the rules is the law of privilege, 
which remains primarily statutory in Minnesota.47  The Minnesota 
judiciary has continued to defer to the legislature’s policy 
judgments on questions of privilege, such as the privilege against 
adverse spousal testimony.48
A. Importance of Federal Evidence Law 
 
The Minnesota Rules of Evidence were substantially identical 
to their federal counterparts at the time of their adoption,49
 
 46. See PETER N. THOMPSON, 11 MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 101.01 (3d 
ed. 2001) (discussing the overview and history of the Minnesota Rules of 
Evidence). 
 47. See MINN. R. EVID. 501 (“Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to 
modify, or supersede existing law relating to the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, state or political subdivision.”). 
 48. See State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 420 (Minn. 2002) (stating the 
preference to “defer a policy determination of this nature to the legislature”). 
 49. See THOMPSON, supra note 46, § 101.01. 
 and 
they continue to be either identical or substantially the same.  The 
status of the rules directly relating to electronic discovery, 
corresponding generally to the five issues identified in Lorraine, are 
set forth in the following table: 
 
10
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Minnesota Evidence Rule50 Federal Counterpart  
Rule 402—Relevance Substantially identical 
Rule 901—Authentication and 
Identification 
Identical 
Rule 902—Self-Authentication Substantially identical, 
although Minnesota has not 
adopted Rules 902(11) and 
(12) relating to certification 
of business records to 
facilitate authentication 
Rule 801—Hearsay Definitions Rules 801(a)–(c) are 
identical; Rule 801(d) (prior 
statements) is substantially 
different 
Rule 802—Hearsay Rule Substantially identical 
Rule 803—Hearsay Exceptions where 
availability of declarant is immaterial 
Many subdivisions are 
identical; business records 
exception (Rule 803(6) uses 
different language but is 
substantially the equivalent) 
Rule 804—Hearsay Exceptions where 
declarant is not available 
Many subdivisions are 
identical; rules are 
substantially similar in 
purpose and interpretation 
Rules 1001 to 1008—Contents of 
Writings (also known as “Original 
Writings Rule” or, less helpfully, the 
“Best Evidence Rule”) 
Each rule is identical  
Rule 403—Relevant evidence may be 
excluded if probative value 
outweighed by unfair prejudice or 
confusion  
Identical 
 
The similarity of the rules is important to Minnesota evidence 
law, for where state and federal rules are substantially similar, the 
Minnesota courts expressly favor using federal precedent to guide 
Minnesota case decision-making.51
 
      50.  The comparisons in this table are drawn from 11A PETER N. THOMPSON & 
DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: COURTROOM HANDBOOK OF MINNESOTA 
EVIDENCE (West 2008) (comparing each state and federal rule in Chapter 1: 
Minnesota Rules of Evidence with Commentary). 
  The federal cases are especially 
 51. The Minnesota Supreme Court has regularly recognized the value in state 
court practice of federal court interpretations of the federal rules.  See, e.g., 
Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 867 n.4 (Minn. 2000) (“Where our 
11
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valuable because many important procedural and evidentiary 
questions are infrequently encountered and are likely not to have 
been addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  The federal 
decisions therefore provide the only useful decisions to guide 
Minnesota courts.  
B. What Does Rule 901 Require for Authentication? 
Authentication, while traditionally not presented as one of the 
more problematic evidence issues, remains a prerequisite for the 
potential admission of any piece of evidence.52  The concept of 
authentication itself is at once both straightforward and lacking in 
precise parameters.53  As Rule 901(a) states, authentication is 
simply accomplished with “evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”54  In 
other words, the proponent of the evidence need only make a 
prima facie showing that the evidence is what the proponent claims 
it to be.  This is not a particularly high threshold since the court 
need not find that the evidence is what it claims to be; there only 
need be sufficient evidence for a jury to reach such a conclusion.55
 
rules of procedure parallel the federal rules, ‘federal cases interpreting the federal 
rule are helpful and instructive but not necessarily controlling’ on our 
interpretation of the state counterpart.” (quoting Johnson v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 
463 N.W.2d 894, 899 n.7 (Minn. 1990))).  See also State v. Deal, 740 N.W.2d 755, 
761 (Minn. 2007). 
 52. See MINN. R. EVID. 901(a) (identifying “authentication or identification as 
a condition precedent to admissibility”); see also id. committee’s cmt. (1977) (“The 
general rule treats authentication in terms of a condition precedent to 
admissibility.”).  Under MINN. R. EVID. 104(a) and 104(b), it is the court and not 
the fact-finder that makes the admissibility determination.  Rule 104(a) governs 
admissibility matters concerning whether an expert is qualified and if the expert’s 
opinions are admissible, the applicability of any privileges, whether evidence is 
hearsay, and if any exception applies.  See MINN. R. EVID. 104(a).  Rule 104(b) 
simply addresses whether the evidence has sufficient probative value for a 
reasonable jury to find that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.  See 
MINN. R. EVID. 104(b) committee’s cmt. (1977).  In doing so, the fact-finder makes 
the final determination of whether the evidence is authentic.  Id. 
 53. MINN. R. EVID. 901(a) committee’s cmt. (1977) (“The concept is 
frequently easy in application but most difficult to define.”). 
 54. MINN. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 55. PETER N. THOMPSON & DAVID F. HERR, 11A MINNESOTA PRACTICE: 
COURTROOM HANDBOOK OF MINNESOTA EVIDENCE 272 (West 2008).   
  
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/2
  
2009] ADMISSIBILITY OF E-EVIDENCE 1465 
C. How Have Minnesota Courts Historically Treated Authentication 
Issues? 
With this standard in mind, Minnesota appellate courts 
generally have not mandated specific requirements for proper 
authentication.56
It is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a standard of 
admissibility at once definite and dependable.  But it 
occurs to us that any relevant writing may be admitted 
when from its contents and other circumstances in 
evidence it is reasonably inferable that the author is the 
person sought to be charged or another lawfully acting for 
him.  “Evidence which, if uncontradicted, would satisfy a 
reasonable mind” is sufficient.
  As noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
1927 in Lundgren v. Union Indemnity Co.: 
57
Thus, as a result of the common law and the general standard 
under Rule 901(a), Minnesota courts have experienced little 
difficulty in deciding authentication issues for a variety of 
documentary and tangible evidence such as telegrams,
  
58 business 
records,59 letters,60 photographs,61 videotapes,62 audiotapes,63
 
 56. PETER N. THOMPSON, 11 MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 901.01 (3d ed. 
2001) (“Very few appellate decisions set out specific rules to be applied by the trial 
judge in making rulings on authentication and identification.”).  But see Furlev 
Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. N. Am. Auto. Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 27 n.9 
(Minn. 1982) (describing a seven-step process for authenticating audiotapes). 
 57. 171 Minn. 122, 125, 213 N.W. 553, 555 (1927). 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 126–27, 213 N.W. at 555 (holding that a telegram is not 
authenticated when there is no evidence offered to support authentication); 
Halstead v. Minn. Tribune Co., 147 Minn. 294, 297–98, 180 N.W. 556, 557–58 
(1920) (explaining that subsequent correspondence, conduct, and 
acknowledgment of receipt successfully authenticated the telegram). 
 59. See, e.g., Lund v. Vill. of Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 484, 85 N.W.2d 197, 
206 (1957) (authenticating business records and noting that “it is not required 
that every person who took part in the compilations of business records should 
testify as to their accuracy”); Watson v. Gardner, 183 Minn. 233, 234, 236 N.W. 
213, 214 (1931) (receiving bank and mortgage company books and records into 
evidence); Johnson v. Burmeister, 182 Minn. 385, 386–87, 234 N.W. 590, 590–91 
(1931) (allowing corporate minutes to be authenticated by corporation’s former 
auditor and director); State v. Johnson, 179 Minn. 217, 221, 228 N.W. 926, 927–28 
(1930) (affirming the admittance of bank books and records); State v. Thornton, 
174 Minn. 323, 326, 219 N.W. 176, 177 (1928) (affirming the admittance of bank 
books and records).  Unlike the federal rules, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence do 
not provide for a specific authentication rule for business records.  Compare FED. R. 
EVID. 902(11) (providing for the authentication of business records), with MINN. R. 
EVID. 902 (providing rules for other self-authenticating documents).  The 
authentication requirement for business records in Minnesota is instead found in 
Rule 803(6) as a hearsay exception.  See MINN. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 public 
13
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records,64 and other types of documentary information.65
 
 60. See, e.g., State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 95 (Minn. 2002) (explaining that 
a letter was not authenticated when the witness denied writing the letter and no 
other evidence was offered to authenticate it). 
 61. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 828 (Minn. 1985) (explaining 
that there was no authentication of photographs of a crime scene taken fourteen 
months after event); LaCombe v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 236 Minn. 86, 93, 51 
N.W.2d 839, 844 (1952) (admitting photographs as authenticated after “ample 
testimony” was offered, establishing that the photos “accurately depicted 
conditions which were the same as those prevailing at the time of the accident”).  
The “conventional method for authenticating photos is referred to as the 
‘pictorial witness theory’ because the photograph is thought to be a pictorial 
representation of what the witness observed.”  In re Welfare of S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d 
162, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).  
 62. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 721–22 (Minn. 2007) (allowing a 
digitized copy of a VHS videotape to be authenticated by establishing chain of 
custody and description of process for digitizing tape); State v. Williams, 337 
N.W.2d 689, 690–91 (Minn. 1983) (involving authentication by a video recorder 
operator who observed events depicted on videotape); S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d at 166 
(authenticating videotape by testimony describing the reliability of the process or 
system that created the tape, as well as by testimony from an observer that 
videotape accurately portrayed the event); Scott v. State, 390 N.W.2d 889, 892–93 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing authentication by a witness who observed events 
depicted on videotape and technician who produced the tape and did not alter it). 
 63. See, e.g., Furlev Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. N. Am. Auto. Warehouse, Inc., 325 
N.W.2d 20, 27 n.9 (Minn. 1982) (describing a seven-step process for 
authenticating audiotapes); see also Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 
2006) (allowing a digital database of phone calls at a workhouse to be 
authenticated using Furlev elements); State v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125, 136–
37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (authenticating a 911 tape based on police testimony); 
In re Gonzalez, 456 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (involving an 
answering machine recording that was authenticated by a witness who identified 
the voice on a recording). 
 64. See, e.g., Hennepin County v. Shasky, 289 Minn. 44, 49–50, 182 N.W.2d 
431, 435 (1970) (allowing authentication of a map by an expert familiar with the 
property on the map); State v. Northway, 588 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding that a price report was not authenticated under MINN. R. EVID. 
901(b)(7), 902 or MINN. STAT. § 600.13 (2008) when no evidence substantiated 
that the price report came from the U.S. Department of Agriculture; the price 
report did not contain a seal, certification, authorized signature, or other such 
marking; and no evidence or authority indicated it was an official publication 
under MINN. R. EVID. 902(5)). 
 65. See, e.g., Gopher Oil Co. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 756, 
765 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (involving an insurance declaration and endorsement 
authenticated under MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)); Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. 
Greene, 463 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing a chemist’s report 
to be authenticated by a chemist’s certification on the report and by chain of 
custody testimony by the police officer who provided the tested substance to the 
chemist). 
  
Circumstantial evidence of authentication will commonly suffice 
when a document’s accuracy is in question because the Minnesota 
14
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Supreme Court has long recognized relevant circumstantial 
evidence as bearing on authentication.66  For example, in State v. 
Johnson, where the issue involved whether entries in a bank’s 
general ledger had been falsified, an examination of the ledger 
records of a separate bank in which the bank kept a deposit 
account satisfied the court that the general ledger records were 
authentic.67  The proponent of the evidence did not present any 
direct testimony that the signatures on the bank’s remittance 
documents to the deposit bank were signatures of bank officers; 
instead, comparison of the documents to an “untainted” third 
party—the depository bank—demonstrated their authenticity.68  
The Minnesota Supreme Court was satisfied by evidence showing 
that the two banks engaged in regular, daily transactions for 
remittances, and withdrawals from which a comparison could be 
made for the accuracy of the bank’s records and identification of 
the falsified entries.69
D. Authentication Issues Raised by ESI 
  
This application of circumstantial evidence to establish 
authentication will continue to play an important role for 
electronically stored information (“ESI”).  Given the wide range of 
forms ESI can take, the heightened potential for its intentional or 
unintentional manipulation, and the relative impossibility of 
eliminating all possibility of such manipulation, circumstantial 
evidence may be a party’s best and perhaps only method to satisfy 
authentication requirements. 
Although satisfying authentication requirements provides a 
sufficient basis for finding that evidence is what it purports to be, 
authentication is not intended or presumed to be completely 
foolproof.70
 
 66. See Lundgren v. Union Indem. Co., 171 Minn. 122, 125, 213 N.W. 553, 
555 (1927) (“Upon the preliminary issue of admissibility, any evidence which 
promises relevancy should be received, at least tentatively, for decision will 
frequently depend upon many circumstances, some of which if isolatedly 
considered would seem irrelevant.”).  
 67. 179 Minn. 217, 218–20, 228 N.W. 926, 927 (1930).  
 68. Id. at 220, 228 N.W. at 927. 
 69. Id.  See also Katzmarek v. Weber Brokerage Co., 214 Minn. 580, 583, 8 
N.W.2d 822, 824 (1943) (allowing admission of telephone call when identity of 
person called could be “established with reasonable certainty by means of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances”). 
  At best, authentication requirements simply present 
 70. In order to authenticate evidence, a proponent need not negate “all 
15
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obstacles to mistakes or manipulation.  While the opportunity for 
mistake or manipulation is heightened when ESI is involved, the 
requirements for authenticating ESI have not necessarily been 
heightened by Minnesota courts in response.71  To date, no 
Minnesota state court decisions have specifically addressed 
authentication of ESI or any requirements for ESI beyond that 
specified by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 901(a) or 902.72  The 
absence of additional guidance may be alarming to some given that 
electronic evidence may involve issues of improper entry, retrieval, 
conversion, or storage of data that can compromise the data’s 
integrity.73
 
possibility of tampering or substitution.”  State v. Johnson, 307 Minn. 501, 505, 239 
N.W.2d 239, 242 (1976).  “Contrary speculation may well affect the weight of the 
evidence  . . . but does not affect its admissibility.”  Id. 
 71. Elsewhere, courts and commentators have been critical of the accuracy of 
ESI and call for more stringent showings of authentication.  See generally United 
States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that “the complex 
nature of computer storage calls for a more comprehensive foundation[,]” but 
admitting a printout of compiled electronic data as a business record); Rudolph J. 
Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 956 (1986).  
 72. This is true even though Minnesota courts have recognized the potential 
for inaccuracy in digital evidence.  See State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Minn. 
2007) (recognizing that “[d]espite the requirement that the duplicate be 
produced by a technique designed to accurately reproduce the original, we 
understand that there is the risk of manipulation or distortion, particularly with 
digitization, and ‘commentators have properly urged courts to exercise greater 
care for photographic evidence.’”) (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 9:23, at 509 (3d ed. 2007)).  Other 
commentators have noted that “[n]o additional authenticating evidence is 
required just because the records are in computerized form rather than pen or 
pencil and paper.”  5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 901.08[1] (2d ed. 2009); see also United States v. Koontz, 143 
F.3d 408, 412 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding “no reason” to reject a booking report 
“simply because it was computer-generated”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004) (“In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to 
computerized data as they do to other types of evidence.”).  
 73. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004) 
(“Accuracy may be impaired by incomplete data entry, mistakes in output 
instructions, programming errors, damage and contamination of storage media, 
power outages, and equipment malfunctions.  The integrity of data may also be 
compromised in the course of discovery by improper search and retrieval 
techniques, data conversion, or mishandling.”). 
  Although the potential for inaccuracy or manipulation 
exists on a larger scale than for paper records, these problems are 
not necessarily unique to ESI.  In fact, the authentication of ESI 
need not necessarily be more time consuming, expensive, or 
problematic than the authentication of traditional writings or 
16
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evidence.74
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of 
taking testimony; (2) a showing that the operator of the 
device was competent; (3) establishment of the 
authenticity and correctness of the recording; (4) a 
showing that changes, additions and deletions have not 
been made; (5) a showing of the manner of the 
preservation of the recording; (6) identification of the 
speakers; and (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was 
voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.
  
Nonetheless, Minnesota evidence law has recognized the need 
to address issues involving potential manipulation of evidence.  In 
Furlev Sales & Associates, Inc. v. North American Automotive Warehouse, 
Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth seven foundational 
elements for admission of a tape recording:  
75
While the Furlev requirements have not always been followed 
for admitting tape recordings,
 
76 several of these factors have the 
potential to apply to ESI.  The requirements of establishing that the 
data is authentic and correct and that “changes, additions and 
deletions have not been made” is a challenge for all forms of ESI 
given the ease in which it can be altered.  In addition, the 
competency of a recording device and its operator has potential 
application to computer-stored or computer-processed data.77
In addition, establishing chain of custody may come into play 
for ESI.  This is a traditional method of demonstrating, through 
testimony or evidence establishing the continuous whereabouts of 
the item at issue, that evidence has not been contaminated or 
altered.
 
78
 
 74. Indeed, the greater time and expense involved in satisfying “fail-safe” 
standards for authenticating ESI likely outweighs the likelihood of the existence of 
mistake or fraud. 
 75. 325 N.W.2d 20, 27 n.9 (Minn. 1982).  In Furlev, the tape recording at issue 
was admitted without meeting these seven foundational requirements but the 
court determined that such error was harmless.  Id. at 27–28. 
 76. Compare Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2006) (finding 
digital database of phone calls at workhouse authenticated under Furlev elements) 
with State v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125, 136–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(authenticating 911 tape based on police testimony) and In re Gonzalez, 456 
N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing authentication of answering 
machine recording by witness who identified the voice on a recording). 
 77. These requirements are more fully discussed infra with regard to MINN. R. 
EVID. 901(b)(9) addressing authentication of a process or system. 
 78. See State v. Johnson, 307 Minn. 501, 504, 239 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1976). 
  Indeed, chain of custody has been an essential element 
for many forms of physical evidence that are not otherwise unique 
17
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and inherently identifiable by their appearance.79  Establishing 
chain of custody does not require eliminating all possibility of 
alteration or manipulation.80  But “the more susceptible the item is 
to alteration, substitution, or change of condition, the greater the 
need to negate such possibilities.”81
E. Rule 901 Authentication Methods for ESI 
Rule 901(b) provides ten non-exhaustive illustrations of 
authentication methods, including direct testimony, circumstantial 
evidence, and proof of custody.  The following authentication 
methods would most commonly apply to different types of ESI: 
  This is particularly true of ESI 
given that it can exist in multiple locations with varying degrees of 
access and can be readily altered.  
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge.  Testimony that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be.82
The simplest and most common form of direct proof to 
authenticate is the production of a witness with personal 
knowledge who testifies that the item is what it purports to be, 
whether through authorship, source, substance, accuracy, or 
otherwise.  The witness may authenticate the document by 
demonstrating proof of authorship or other connection, including 
by witnessing authorship or receipt of the document.
 
83  This rule 
encompasses a variety of ESI, including e-mail, instant messages, 
text messages, chat rooms, and web pages.84
 
 79. See, e.g., State v. Bellikka, 490 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(establishing that a chain of custody is required for common items such as 
controlled substances and bodily fluids). 
 80. State v. Hager, 325 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1982) (quoting M. Graham, 
Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Relevance and Exclusion of Relevant Evidence—
Real Evidence, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 241, 243–47 (1982)). 
 81. Id.  
 82. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). 
 83. See id. 
  
 84. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554–56 (D. Md. 2007); 
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 n.2 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that 
authentication of e-mail may occur by a witness with personal knowledge of e-
mail); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
authentication of chat rooms may occur by a person who participated in the chat 
room, can identify chat room users, and can testify that the chat room log is an 
accurate representation).  For a web page, the party could offer a witness who 
visited the website at a particular URL address—whether it be a website 
administrator or third party—reviewed its content and testified that the printout 
or other exhibit accurately reflected what was at the URL address.  Accord St. 
Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, No. 8:06-CV-223-T-MSS, 2006 WL 
18
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(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness.  Comparison by 
the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens that 
have been authenticated.85
Authentication may occur via comparison by the factfinder or 
expert witness with previously authenticated examples.
 
86  Such a 
comparison by the fact finder, however, is subject to limitations 
recognized by the rule drafters.87  Clearly, the more sophisticated 
the evidence is or the more specialized knowledge is needed to 
interpret it, the less likely jurors will be allowed to authenticate 
such evidence.  This may implicate certain types of ESI, such as 
technical computer data or metadata that may require analysis by 
expert witnesses.  On the other hand, more common and easily 
identified forms of ESI, such as e-mail, can be authenticated under 
this Rule by jurors.88
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like.  Appearance, 
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
 
89
The presence of distinctive characteristics, including 
circumstantial evidence, that show that the evidence is what it 
purports to be provides sufficient authentication under Minnesota 
Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4).
  
90
 
1320242, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006) (requiring testimony from person with 
personal knowledge of a website, such as a webmaster, to authenticate printouts 
from a website); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 
3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (finding that an Internet 
archive is a form of evidence).  Other courts, however, appear to require more 
stringent standards for website authentication.  See United States v. Jackson, 208 
F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no authentication of website postings 
because proponent needed to show that website postings were actually posted by 
particular group and not proponent herself), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 973 (2000).  
 85. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). 
 86. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977) (“The practice of allowing jurors to 
determine the authenticity of a writing has been approved in Minnesota.”) (citing 
State v. Houston, 278 Minn. 41, 44, 153 N.W.2d 267, 269 (1967)). 
 87. Id. (“The rule should not be read as a statement that jurors can 
authenticate other matters by comparison techniques without the benefit of 
expert testimony, e.g., ballistics or fingerprints.  These questions must be resolved 
on a case by case basis.”). 
 88. See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (allowing jurors to compare e-mails 
with authenticated e-mails from same purported sender in order to authenticate 
them under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(3)). 
 89. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
 90. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977) (“This illustration indicates that an offer of 
evidence can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence.”). 
  Circumstantial proof of authenticity 
has long been recognized as an acceptable method of 
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authentication.91  For example, letters, telegrams, and telephone 
conversations were commonly authenticated by the “reply 
doctrine.”92  The reply doctrine recognizes that distinctive content 
or substance in a communication can demonstrate the source, 
author, or other authenticity.93  This same doctrine can apply to e-
mail, text, and instant messages94 with the recipient’s use of the 
reply function.  Other distinct characteristics of e-mail that may 
provide sufficient circumstantial evidence include the sender’s e-
mail address and contents of the e-mail that may reveal details only 
known to the sender and the person receiving the message.95  
These “distinctive characteristics,” however, are still subject to the 
risk that someone other than the named sender sent the message.  
Thus, a court may still require a witness with personal knowledge 
under Rule 901(b)(1) to attest to the accuracy of the contents or 
other information related to the message, such as its transmission 
date or time.96
Another method for authentication under Rule 901(b)(4) for 
ESI is the use of hash values.
 
97
 
 91. Id.  But see Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449 
(9th Cir. 1994).  
 92. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) committee’s cmt. (1977); Merchants’ Nat’l Bank 
v. State Bank of Worthington, 172 Minn. 24, 30, 214 N.W. 750, 753 (1927) 
(concluding telephone conversation authenticated that affirmed previous 
agreement  kate – I’m not sure what this parenthetical is trying to say); Halstead v. 
Minn. Tribune Co., 147 Minn. 294, 297–99, 180 N.W. 556, 557–58 (1920) 
(determining reply telegraph authenticated  same comment); Hoxsie v. Empire 
Lumber Co., 41 Minn. 548, 550, 43 N.W. 476, 477 (1889) (determining reply letter 
authenticated  same).  
 93. 11 PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE § 901.05 
(3d ed. 2001). 
 94. An in-depth analysis of authentication of instant messages has been 
addressed elsewhere.  See e.g., Andrew M. Grossman, No, Don’t IM Me—Instant 
Messaging Authentication, and the Best Evidence Rule, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1309 
(2006). 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39–41 (D.D.C. 2006).  Instant 
messages have also been authenticated under rules similar to 901(b)(4).  In re F.P., 
878 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
 96. WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 72, § 900.73[3][c]. 
  A hash value is “[a] unique 
 97. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546–47 (D. Md. 2007) 
(“Hash values can be inserted into original electronic documents when they are 
created to provide them with distinctive characteristics that will permit their 
authentication under [Fed.] Rule 901(b)(4).”).  See also Federal Evidence Review, 
Using “Hash” Values in Handling Electronic Evidence, 
http://federalevidence.com/blog/2008/september/using-
%E2%80%9Chash%E2%80%9D-values-handling-electronic-evidence (Sept. 18, 
2008) (discussing additional uses for hash values for electronic evidence during 
20
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numerical identifier that can be assigned to a file, a group of files, 
or a portion of a file, based on a standard mathematical algorithm 
applied to the characteristics of the data set.”98  The likelihood of 
data sets having the same hash values “is less than one in a 
billion.”99  Thus, the hash value “is used to guarantee the 
authenticity of an original data set and can be used as a digital 
equivalent of the Bates stamp used in paper document 
production.”100
Metadata may also provide sufficient distinctive characteristics 
for authentication of electronic information under Rule 
901(b)(4).
  Therefore, one can fairly determine that a copy of 
an electronic file has not been altered if its hash value is identical 
to the hash value of the original. 
101  Metadata is essentially data about data, which 
“describes how, when, and by whom the data set or document was 
collected, created, accessed, or modified; its size; and how it is 
formatted.”102  Although this type of information is useful for 
attempting authentication under Rule 901(b)(4), it does not 
appear to have the same accuracy as hash values and may require 
additional authentication methods such as witnesses with personal 
knowledge or expert testimony.103
(9)  Process or System.  Evidence describing a process or 
system used to produce a result and showing that the 
process or system produces an accurate result.
 
104
The admissibility of evidence based on X-rays, computer 
printouts, voice-prints, public opinion polls, etc., all 
depend upon a showing that the process or system used 
does produce an accurate result.  The degree of accuracy 
required might vary with the purposes for which the 
evidence is being offered, the state of the art, and the type 
 
This illustration in the Rule’s commentary is the only one 
specifically contemplating computer-related evidence in the 
Minnesota Rules: 
 
litigation).  
 98. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF 
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 24 (2007). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547. 
 102. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 24–25. 
 103. See Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 530 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(noting that metadata may be changed by saving electronic files in different 
locations). 
 104. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). 
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of method or process involved.105
Rule 901(b)(9) may be useful for ESI resulting from a 
computer program designed to produce a result, i.e., computer-
generated information, as opposed to information or data that is 
simply stored on a computer.
  
106  Thus, computational software, 
graphs, tables, animations, and spreadsheets could all fall into this 
authentication category.  Although no Minnesota courts have 
addressed any specific requirements for Rule 901(b)(9), a party 
would be well advised to be able to show, at a minimum, that the 
computer process or system at issue is reliable and provides 
accurate results, explain the procedure or protocol for providing 
data to the computer process or system, and show that such 
procedure or protocol was followed in the producing the results at 
issue.107
(10)  Methods provided by statute or rule.  Any method of 
authentication or identification provided by Legislative 
Act or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to statutory authority.
 
108
This rule was “intended to make it clear that rule 901 does not 
limit or supersede other forms of authentication.”
 
109  For example, 
Minnesota passed the Electronic Authentication Act in 1997.110  
The Act provides for the authentication of certified digital 
signatures, although the Act is still subject to court evidentiary 
requirements.111
 
 105. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977). 
 106. Information that is simply stored in electronic form may be adequately 
authenticated under Minnesota Rule 901(b)(1).  “In general, electronic 
documents are records that are merely stored on a computer and raise no 
computer-specific authentication issues.”  JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 900.06[3] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997). 
 107. A far more demanding showing, consisting of an eleven-step test, has 
been delineated by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel for authentication under 
Federal Rule 901(b)(9).  See In re Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.  
2005).  
 108. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(10). 
 109. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977). 
 110. MINN. STAT. §§ 325K.01–.28 (2008). 
 111. The defined purposes of the Act are to facilitate commerce by means of 
reliable electronic messages, minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures 
and fraud in electronic commerce, implement international standards created to 
ensure reliability and authenticity of electronic messages, and establish uniform 
rules with other states in this area.  § 325K.02.  The Act, however, specifically 
acknowledges that it does not supersede court rules “governing the use of 
electronic messages and documents.”  Id. § 325K.27. 
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F.  Self-Authentication Under Rule 902 
In addition to the authentication methods illustrated under 
Rule 901, Rule 902 provides for self-authentication methods that do 
not need the extrinsic evidence of a witness providing foundational 
testimony.112  In other words, Rule 902 simply obviates the need for 
preliminary authentication by the proponent but does not 
preclude other evidentiary challenges.113
(5)  Official Publications.  Books, pamphlets, or other 
publications purporting to be issued by public authority.
  Two 902 rules stand out 
as being potentially applicable to ESI. 
114
The identification of “publications” under this rule may apply 
to the website of a public authority, such as the government.
 
115  
Some courts, however, still find websites, even from public 
authorities, inherently suspect given the potential for third parties 
to infiltrate such sites and alter the content.116
 
 112. As a result, any challenge to such evidence is relevant only to the weight, 
and not admissibility, of the evidence.  The admissibility, however, may still be 
challenged under other exclusionary rules such as Rules 402, 403, 501, 702, 802, 
or 1002.  THOMPSON & HERR, supra note 12, at 279.  
 113. As noted by Minnesota courts, “[s]elf-authenticating, however, does not 
mean that no authentication is required.”  State v. Northway, 588 N.W.2d 180, 182 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 114. MINN. R. EVID. 902(5). 
 115. See, e.g., U.S. E.E.O.C. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. Civ.A. 03-
1605, 2004 WL 2347556 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (finding webpage printouts from 
the U.S. Census Bureau website self-authenticating under FED. R. EVID. 902(5)); 
Sannes v. Jeff Wyler Chevrolet, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21748, at *10 n.3 (S.D. 
Ohio, Mar. 31, 1999) (holding FTC press releases from FTC website were self-
authenticating official publications under FED. R. EVID. 902(5)). 
 116. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 
744, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding information about boat’s ownership from U.S. 
Coast Guard Vessel Database website inadmissible because Internet information 
was “inherently untrustworthy” due to possibility of hackers); State v. Davis, 10 
P.3d 977, 1010 (Wash. 2000) (rejecting state population statistics from official state 
website because “an unauthenticated printout obtained from the Internet does 
not . . . qualify as a self-authenticating document” under Washington’s 
counterpart Rule 902(e)).  Even Minnesota courts have required some type of 
additional authenticating testimony from “self-authenticating” documents.  See 
Northway, 588 N.W.2d at 182 (price report from U.S. Department of Agriculture 
was not authenticated absent testimony from an authorized person, seal, 
certificate, or other indication of genuineness). 
  Nonetheless, given 
the increasing number of government agencies with websites and 
the posting of official publications on their websites, Rule 902(5) 
will likely be increasingly offered as a basis for authentication.  
Elsewhere, courts have found printed government websites to be 
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self-authenticating if the offering party can show specific 
identifying information for the website.117
The rule commentary acknowledges that this rule is “based on 
the unlikelihood of forgery of a trade inscription.”
 
(7)  Trade inscriptions and the like.  Inscriptions, signs, tags, 
or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of 
business and indicating ownership, control, or origin. 
118  As applied to 
ESI, this rule could provide authentication for an e-mail containing 
a tag identifying the company-employer and the origin of the e-
mail.119
G. Shortcuts to Authentication of ESI 
  Many business e-mails include signature blocks, provide 
such information as the sender’s name, company, job title, physical 
address, telephone number, and e-mail address.  Of course, 
authentication of e-mails under Rule 902(7) are subject to the same 
problems as authentication of e-mails under Rule 901(b)(4) 
because the e-mail may have been sent from someone other than 
the identified sender.  In that event, a party may still be required to 
authenticate the e-mail by a witness with personal knowledge under 
Rule 901(b)(1). 
In searching for the least burdensome, but most reliable, 
method of authenticating ESI, parties should not forget other 
methods available to them under the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Much of the authentication gymnastics for ESI, as well 
as for any other types of evidence, can be avoided by judicious use 
of available pretrial and discovery rules.120
 
 117. Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (D. Md. 2008) (“A proponent 
of ESI could use the URL, date, and/or official title on a printed webpage to show 
that the information was from a public authority’s website, and therefore, self-
authenticating.  Similarly, the public authority’s selection of the posted 
information for publication on its website will act as the necessary ‘seal of 
approval’ needed to establish that the information came from a public authority 
for purposes of [Federal] Rule 902(5).”). 
 118. MINN. R. EVID. 902(7) committee’s cmt. (1989). 
 119. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 900.07[3][c][i] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997) 
(noting that an e-mail signature block “alone may be sufficient to authenticate an 
e-mail under Rule 902(7)”).  See also Superhighway Consulting, Inc. v. Techwave, 
Inc., No. 98 CV 5502, 1999 WL 1044870, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) 
(authenticating e-mail based on signature block, among other factors). 
  For example, Rule 
 120. Indeed, the writers of the Manual for Complex Litigation recommend that 
“[i]ssues concerning accuracy and reliability of computerized evidence, including 
any necessary discovery, should be addressed during pretrial proceedings and not 
raised for the first time at trial.”  MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 
24
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16.03(c) specifically contemplates obtaining stipulations regarding 
the authenticity of documents as well as seeking advance rulings on 
the admissibility of evidence.121  Alternatively, a party could use 
requests to admit the authenticity of particular documents, 
including ESI, under Rule 36.01.122  Finally, some courts have 
found that a party who produces ESI during discovery implicitly 
admits its authenticity by doing so and is thus barred from later 
objecting to its admission by the opposing party on authentication 
grounds.123
H. Electronic Evidence for Illustrative Purposes 
 
Some “evidence” is not really substantive, but is allowed to be 
considered by the fact-finder as “illustrative.”124  Illustrative 
evidence may be allowed, but is subject to the same limitations 
whether created or stored in an electronic format or in India ink 
on vellum.125  It is not substantive evidence in the case—it does not 
help a party carry a burden of proof and is not considered in 
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a claim.  An 
illustrative exhibit that is misleading or not fairly produced can be 
excluded, usually under Rule 403.126
The presentation of evidence may be objectionable even if the 
exhibit itself is otherwise admissible.  For example, in a failure-to-
diagnose medical malpractice case, the x-rays of the patient would 
invariably be admissible.  But the court might very well exclude 
magnified portions of those x-ray films.
  
127
 
21.446. 
 121. MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.03(c). 
 122. MINN. R. CIV. P. 36.01.  
 123. See Sprinkle v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., No. 04-CV-4116-JPG, 2006 WL 
2038580, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 19, 2006); Superhighway Consulting, Inc., 1999 WL 
1044870, at *4–5; and  Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Wiley, No. 
IP 94-1175-C-T/G, 1998 WL 1988826, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 13, 1998).  
 124. See, e.g., Strasser v. Stabeck, 112 Minn. 90, 92, 127 N.W. 384, 385 (1910) 
(holding that the admissibility of illustrative evidence is “admitted, when properly 
verified, to illustrate or express the testimony of a competent witness, but [is] not 
original evidence”). 
 125. Verification and authentication of such evidence may be made by having 
a knowledgeable witness testify that the exhibit is a substantially correct 
representation of what that witness independently observed.  MINN. R. EVID. 
901(b)(1).  
 126. See, e.g., Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 
124857 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) (excluding computerized accident reconstruction 
due to a distorted data presentation). 
  This result would 
 127. See, e.g., Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Assocs., P.A., 860 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 
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presumably be reached regardless of whether the x-rays were digital 
images stored in a computer or traditional films stored in manila 
sleeves with the patient’s chart. 
V. HOW WILL MINNESOTA COURTS TREAT 
ADMISSIBILITY OF ESI? 
Given the court’s considerable discretion to admit evidence 
and the variety of authentication methods available under the 
Minnesota Rules of Evidence, courts have not been inclined to 
deviate from the existing rules of evidence for authenticating 
evidence that involves computers or electronic technology.128
It may be one of those things with respect to which the 
common law of evidence should demonstrate its ability to 
adapt its concepts of admissibility to the current and 
universal practices of business.  The need will remain 
however to bring forward the best evidence which the case 
sensibly permits. That done, the writing should be 
admitted if from the evidence there can be drawn the 
necessary inference of authorship.
  Over 
eighty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the 
ability of basic evidentiary rules to evolve and apply to future 
technologies: 
129
Not only should traditional evidentiary rules apply equally to future 
technologies, but the discretion and common sense of the court 
similarly provides a mechanism for dealing with new technologies 
 
 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (excluding x-rays that were enlarged 30 to 150 times 
and projected on a six by eight-foot screen, showing detail not discernable on 
original x-rays).  The result in this case might well have been the opposite if the 
150-times enlargement was shown to be the standard medical practice for reading 
these films. 
 128. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Minn. 2007) 
(authenticating digital photographs).  See also In re Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 444 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“Authenticating a paperless electronic record, in principle, 
poses the same issue as for a paper record, the only difference being the format in 
which the record is maintained . . . .”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra 
note 8, § 11.446 (“In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to 
computerized data as they do to other types of evidence.”).  Vinhnee has been 
viewed as establishing a stricter standard for admission of electronic evidence.  See, 
e.g., Cooper Offenbecher, Admitting Computer Record Evidence After In re Vinhnee: A 
Stricter Standard for the Future?, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 6 (2007).  However, 
this stricter standard appears not to have been widely followed.  Id.   
 129. Lundgren v. Union Indem. Co., 171 Minn. 122, 125, 213 N.W. 553, 555 
(1927). 
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under “old” rules.130  In addition, courts should continue to rely on 
the parties to make challenges to proffered evidence and point out 
potential pitfalls and inadequacies to authentication of current 
technologies.131
 
 130. See Johnson v. Burmeister, 182 Minn. 385, 387, 234 N.W. 590, 591 (1931) 
(“The discretion of the trial judge as to how much and what foundation to require 
for the introduction of documentary evidence is not so limited as to prevent his 
exercise of common sense.”). 
 131. See State v. Hagar, 325 N.W.2d 43, 44–45 (Minn.1982) (“If, upon 
consideration of the evidence as a whole, the court determines that the evidence is 
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror that the matter in question is 
what its proponent claims, the evidence will be admitted.  The party against whom 
the evidence has been received may . . . offer contradictory evidence . . . or 
challenge the credibility of the supporting proof . . . . The trier of fact renders the 
ultimate decision as to whether the item of real evidence . . . is as it is purported to 
be.”). 
 
The starting point—and often the end point—of the analysis 
should often be to ignore the format of the proffered evidence.  If 
it is admissible in a nineteenth-century format, it probably should 
be admitted in the twenty-first century, at least in the absence of a 
serious challenge to its authenticity.  Because of the potential for 
electronic records to be manipulated, however, courts should be 
open to considering good faith challenges to the authenticity of 
evidence, and hold proponents of questionable evidence to their 
burdens of establishing admissibility.   
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